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The relationship between democracy and European
integration
1 European integration was not a chance development. It did not occur in parallel with
the greatest democratic surge in European history, which followed in the wake of the
Second World War.  It  was instead a  consequence of  the close link which had been
established between the search for a wide social consensus on democratic values, and
the emergence of certain projects which required the surrender of national sovereignty
to new supranational entities.1 This interaction developed in two phases, each with its
respective  consequences:  the  first  was  linked to  the  initial  steps  of  the  integration
process,  and  the  second  had  its  origin  in  the  European  Community’s  two-phase
expansion, first towards the south and then towards the east of the continent.2 It is
clear that, as regards this second phase, the European Community went further than
the Treaties signed at its foundation, transforming itself progressively into a model for
the establishment of democratic regimes in Europe.3
2 First  of  all,  official  approval  of  policies  and  institutions  was  a  pre-requisite  for
European  Economic  Community  (EEC)  membership:  countries  which  had  a  recent
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history of  dictatorship and had then undergone a  complex process  of  transition to
democracy4 came in for particular scrutiny. Secondly, this strategy was developed in
parallel  with  the  efforts  of  EEC  institutions  to  define  a  European  identity  in  the
international arena,5 as a consequence of which –and here we come to the third point–,
they obtained powers and responsibilities neither contemplated nor regulated by the
founding  Treaties.  These  were  implemented  by  the  Community  in  more  or  less
interested support of the democratising process.6 The resulting policies proved to be
more procedural than institutional: conflicting, and on occasion incompatible, national
interests, led to policies that were often contradictory in their objectives and whose
execution was anything but smooth.
3 Three key ideas emerge when we examine the conduct of the EEC institutions following
the  process  of  political  transition7:  1) their  influence  as  promoters  of  democracy
appears to be concentrated at  the moment of  collapse of  the authoritarian regime;
2) their  democratisation  policies  reinforce  the  need  for  the  key  players  in  the
integration process to formulate strategies in the face of imminent political change, at
the same time forcing them to weigh up the consequences of this democratisation from
the point of view of the European Community; 3) the coherence and efficiency of this
action depends as much on the degree of consensus reached by the member states as
on the extent of influence achieved by the Community in previous negotiations with
the country undergoing the transition process, taking into account the low levels of
development  of  that  country’s  operational  capabilities,  and  the  inexistence  of  a
previous EEC doctrine regarding its membership.
4 From this multi-faceted and complex perspective a series of issues emerge which, we
believe,  form  part  of  a  wider  research  agenda,  influencing  both  the  progression
towards Spanish democracy and the Community’s approach to the process of political
change in southern Europe as a whole during the seventies.8 Undoubtedly one of the
most significant issues was the crisis arising between the European Community and the
Franco regime which, following an international protest campaign, the like of which
had not been witnessed since Spain’s international isolation in the immediate post-war
era, culminated in the suspension of negotiations with the EEC between October 1975
and January 1976.9
5 This decision to suspend negotiations prompts a series of questions as to its aims and
achievements and, given the implication it was to have for the transition process and
consolidation of democracy, it should be considered within a wider framework than
that of promotion of democracy.
6 We feel that this decision was made ultimately because it was impossible in practice to
separate the formulation of potential EEC strategies, in the face of uncertainty about
the aftermath of Franco’s death, from the positions adopted by member states on the
type of relationship to be established between the Community and the new regime
which  would  emerge  from  this  political  change.  All  this  was  happening  within  a
framework defined by  the  debate  about  how a  new Europe was  to  be  constructed,
against a background of unremitting pressure from a complex Community agenda.10
 
EEC Policies on the democratisation process 
7 While no Community doctrine on the democratisation process existed as such prior to
the 1993 Copenhagen summit,11 what can be observed is a long period of gestation,
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commencing  with  the  Birkelback  Report  to  the  European  Parliament  (1962)  and
continuing in the conclusions drawn by the Dehousse, Davignon and Tindemans reports
(1967, 1973 and 1975 respectively).  These positions were reaffirmed in the Common
Declaration  of  the  European  Parliament,  Council  and  Commission  on  fundamental
rights  on  5 April  1977,  and  in  particular  after  the  1979  Election to  the  European
Parliament by universal suffrage, with the presentation of the 1984 Spinelli Project for
the  European  Union,  partially  contained  in  the  Single  Europe  Act  and  far  more
concisely in the Preamble to the European Treaty.
8 The Declaration on European Identity (15 December 1973), which synthesised the core
values  that  form the basis  of  European integration,  is  usually  regarded as  the first
milestone  in  the  setting  out  of  the  European  institutions’  aims.  This  Declaration
affirmed  that  the  constituent  elements  of  the  European  Union  are “determined  to
defend the principles of representative democracy, of the rule of law, of social justice
[…]  and  of  respect  for  human rights”,  to  coincide  with  the  universalization  of  the
treatise on democracy and human rights given momentum by the Helsinki Declaration.
12
9 However,  the December 1973 Declaration,  designed to reconcile the Old Continent’s
search for peace and stability (particularly of the economic kind) with the development
of a democratic bond between European countries, was also a response to the strategic
challenge of broadening the EEC’s sphere of political and economic influence, and the
integration  of  other  European  countries  into  its institutions.13 The  Community’s
support  for  democracy  in  Greece,  Spain  and  Portugal, and  these  countries’  full
incorporation into Europe,14 should therefore not be seen as a clearly defined doctrine,
but rather be considered within the context of the set of measures adopted in the face
of potential risks to the continuity of this same integration process. A disruption of this
process  would have resulted in the internal  destabilisation of  these countries,  with
consequences for the balance of power in the Mediterranean region and the fragile
East-West détente line presided over by Europe.15 It is therefore inaccurate to assume
the existence of a structured doctrine, and even less of well-defined strategies, for the
period we are examining.16
10 Secondly, when considering the implementation of strategies for the promotion and
defence of democracy in southern Europe, we should also bear in mind the double crisis
–economic  and  institutional–  which  only  added  to  the  Community’s  already
overburdened  agenda  during  the  mid-seventies.  This  situation  required  a  more
prominent  role  on  the  international  stage  for  the  European  structure,  and  Europe
began to emerge from this crisis when the integration process was once again set in
motion.17
11 One of the main factors behind these transformations was the change of government in
the main EEC countries, and the subsequent emergence of new leaders who were to
become key players in Community reforms during those years.18 And yet,  when we
assess the internal situation of member states with regard to the southern European
countries,  we are  left  with the impression that  the direction of  progress  was  from
political towards economic conditionality. However it was, of course, not a case of an
organised corpus, nor would it be correct to speak of a protocol for a specific course of
action.
12 The way in which the European project gradually defined itself does not appear to have
been so much the result of “moral imperatives” linked to the defence of democracy or
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respect  for  human  rights,  but  rather  the  consequence  of  the  precarious  balance
established between the national interests of member states, and the need to prevent
the failure of the economic integration process, which was the main focus of European
concern at that time. As we shall see in the case of Spain, the European institutions’
attitude towards the final crisis of the Franco regime, and later towards the Spanish
democratisation process in relation to Europe, clearly demonstrates that the inherent
logic in these changes led to a series of conflicts arising between an undefined “moral
imperative”, linked to the development of a European identity within the international
sphere,  and  economic  considerations  set  within  the  narrower  confines  of  national
interest.19
13 Thirdly,  by  the  1970s  the  European  institutions  could  already  boast  significant
diplomatic,  political  and economic resources in their relations with third countries,
built up over the previous decade.20 These resources –although dependent on formal
and informal procedures for the reconciliation of national positions– made possible the
advancement of democracy from 1973 onwards; but there was little coherence between
member states on many occasions when it came to dealing with concrete problems.21
14 We should not be surprised, therefore, that the policies of promotion of democracy,
particularly  those  developed  within  the  framework  of  the  European  Political
Cooperation (EPC)22 –and at least until the Single Europe Act came into force in 1986–
were in response to agreements adopted internally between member states, as these
policies  were  outside  the  competence  of  both  the  European Commission  and
Parliament. As Richard Young recalls, when it came down to it, they were instruments
of member states’ foreign policies.23
15 In fact, the member states’ efforts to coordinate their foreign policies were confined to
areas and problems where their national interests converged, and to address these they
developed ad hoc strategies which they swiftly perfected, drawing on the experience of
intergovernmental  cooperation  and  Community  resources,  regardless  of  any  legal
framework.24 In other words, beneath the European institutions’ “official discourse” in
support  of  democracy  in  Southern  Europe,  a  set  of  economic  and  political
conditionality criteria were being defined. These would be applied to third countries in
their relations with the European Community, regardless of whether they were seeking
full  or  associate  membership.25 These  criteria  were  formulated  to  serve  national
interests, and at times they conflicted with European interests which were themselves
making  slow  headway.  Policies  were  adapted  over  time  and,  in  the  pre-transition
period,  ranged  from  political  veto  to  the  suspension  of  ongoing  agreements  or
negotiations,  depending  on  objectives  as  diverse  as  moral  condemnation,  or  the
consolidation of moderate political alternatives. In the last analysis they responded to
the  need to  establish  greater  freedom in  order  to  put  limits  on  potential  bouts  of
destabilising activity.
16 Later on, during the transition phase, the Community established what it considered to
be  acceptable  conditions  for  democratisation  (under  the  umbrella  of  a  diffuse
“European  interest”  or  in  the  name  of  the  fledgling  political  Europe).  Economic
measures were the main tool for monitoring and, to a certain degree, controlling these
conditions. Member states and the European institutions were also involved in a more
or less subtle game of diplomatic pressure. According to Pridham,26 criteria of economic
and political conditionality were applied. Economic conditionality was based on making
the awarding of certain benefits 
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–aid,  advantages,  agreements,  membership–  subject  to  the  fulfilment  of  a  series  of
conditions. Political conditionality was characterised by applicant States agreeing to
principles  of  freedom,  democracy,  respect  for  human rights  and the  Constitutional
State.  The  turning  point  for  these  political  and  economic  policies  came  with  the
opening of membership negotiations –one of the symbolic milestones in acceptance of
policies  and  institutions–  at  which  point  the  Community  began  to  develop  better
structured  strategies,  directed  as  much  towards  the  defence  and  subsequent
consolidation  of  new  democratic  systems  as  towards  the  safeguarding  of  member
states’ national interests. 
17 Broadly speaking, these policies can be explained as follows. On the one hand, the EEC
gradually applied pressure by means of  diplomatic mechanisms and negotiations;  it
promoted basic, although not unique, interaction with European countries under its
influence and therefore susceptible to integration, once the process of westernisation
and Europeanisation had been set in motion.27 It initiated processes which developed
from negotiating procedures where the influence on a third country was the result of a
combination of  at  least  three variables:  it  adapted existing negotiations to suit  EEC
interests;  it  influenced  the  degree  of  agreement  reached  between  the  position  of
different nation states with regard to the ongoing negotiation process; and it had an
effect on the extent of political implementation of the partial results of negotiation,
both in the Community and the third country.28
18 On the other hand, we should consider the EEC’s individual relationship with the third
country in question.  The implementation of democracy,  which opened the doors to
membership negotiations with the European Community, and which signalled the end
of the Transition period, did not automatically mean a swift completion of negotiations.
The pace of talks varied from one country to another, depending on each one’s internal
situation,29 its economic muscle or how far the formation of the EEC had progressed,
not  only  at  the  time  when  the  process  of  political  change  commenced,  but,  more
importantly, when membership negotiations were set in motion. 
19 In fact, once it had decisively influenced the creation of greater freedom, the European
Community took its time verifying that democracy had been properly established in a
country.  It  would  ask  questions  about  the  compatibility  of  the  degree  of  economic
development, about attitudes towards progress, and about the lack of experience with
regard  to  Community  practices  of  a  bureaucracy  and  political  leadership  whose
attributes were –for various reasons– considered dubious.30 Here we should once again
emphasise  the  importance  of  the  effect  these  negotiations  had  on  the  transition
process,  in  particular  when  we  consider  that  EEC  membership  symbolised  the
completion of the transition to democracy in southern European countries. 
20 Few  advantages,  and  even  fewer  special  exceptions,  were  offered  to  the  candidate
countries at that time. The EEC demanded that they unreservedly accept Community
uses, allowing a degree of flexibility only during the transition period for legislative
transposition  and  effective  completion.  In  the  wake  of  political  change,  the  EEC
implemented  its  policies  with  a  view  to  commencing  membership  negotiations,
coinciding  with  the  period  of  democratic  consolidation.  Evidently,  if  a  country
embraced democracy then membership negotiations could be initiated, but this did not
necessarily  mean a  swift  completion of  these  negotiations.  Spain,  for  example,  was
treated like any other European State: the same demands were made of it as of other
European countries which had not undergone the traumatic experience of years living
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under  an  undemocratic  regime.31 Finally,  it  should  be  pointed  out  that  all  three
Community institutions –Council, Commission and Parliament– were involved in these
negotiations. Their functions were divided up asymmetrically in a process not without
its controversies, contradictions, interests and prejudices. In fact, the behaviour of the
Community members with regard to the transitions in southern Europe demonstrates
the  complex  development  of  their  procedures  and capabilities,  reflecting  the  EEC’s
transformation  from  a  Community  with  little  international  influence  (beyond  the
original remit of trade) into one which aspired to play a greater role in international
relations, above all within its immediate geographical and cultural setting. It was a role
whose development, it should be stressed, would not be without contradictions, as a
consequence  of  the  constant  interaction  of  economic  and  political,  but  also
institutional  and  procedural  issues,  in  an  area  where  intergovernmental
responsibilities  (decision  making)  and  those  of  the  Community  (execution  of  these
decisions) were brought together.
 
Spain-Europe relations and the final crisis of the
Franco regime
21 Relations between Spain and the European Community32 during the final years of the
Franco regime were defined by a complex and inconclusive negotiating process, set in
motion after the signing of the Preferential Trade Agreement on 29 June 1970.33 These
relations were to all intents and purposes in a deadlock from the end of 1972, when
negotiations over the addition of an Additional Protocol34 were concluded, until the end
of the Franco dictatorship.35
22 Even though the aspirations of  the Franco regime to improve its  ties with Brussels
provoked an ever more demanding EEC assessment of the evolution of Spanish policy,
which  in  turn  resulted  in  a  progressive  hardening  of  the  Community’s  negotiating
position,  the  lack  of  unanimity  among  member  states  and  within  the  different
Community institutions over the issues raised by Spain conditioned the attitude of the
European Community.36 The Commission, for example, tried throughout this time to
strike a  balance between positions that  were virtually  irreconcilable.  The European
Parliament, on the other hand, supported the Spanish opposition and allowed a boycott
of  Franco’s  Spain  to  go  ahead  in  the  autumn  of  1975  as  part  of  a  campaign  to
delegitimise the dictatorship.37
23 If, during the 1960s, Spain had not figured prominently on the Community’s agenda, in
the  1970’s  it  came  to  the  fore  as  a  result  of  the  political  dimension  which  the
relationship acquired due to the repression of the Spanish opposition. Following the
first enlargement, spain’s position was economic and institutional; at the time of the
formulation of the EEC’s Mediterranean policy, it had become more geostrategic.38
24 Evidently,  the  philosophy  behind  the  integration  process  and  the  Community
patrimony itself were significant obstacles in relations with Europe, but the attitude of
the  Spanish  regime did  little  to  smooth the  process.  On the  one  hand,  the  regime
continued  to  a  great  extent  to  play  the  victim  role,  denouncing  as  intrusion  in
sovereign affairs any criticism the Community might make of its internal situation, and
in 1962 a political veto was imposed. This situation served only to demonstrate how
complex it was for the dictatorship to shift its level of engagement (or disengagement)
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from a bilateral to a multilateral framework like the EEC, presenting as it did a whole
range of different interests and attitudes.39
25 On the other hand, the maximalist  demands laid out on the negotiating table went
beyond the possibilities set out in the mandates for negotiation which the Commission
was working with.40 Relations deteriorated progressively, in particular in the aftermath
of the Council meeting held on 4 February 1974, when new member states were given
authority  to  resolve  the  question  of  the  application  of  the  Spain-EEC  agreement
autonomously. The attempts at opening negotiation, held on 18 October 1973 and 20
and 21 November 1974, all failed.41
26 Following the Paris European Council meeting in December 1974, the Community’s own
inherent development needs came to monopolise the Commission’s work agenda, to the
detriment  of  relations  with  Spain.  This  period  was  characterised  by  delays  in  the
formulation of negotiating mandates on the part of the Council to the Commission,42
omissions and silence with respect to matters of interest for Spain, or by declarations
with  a  clear  political  intention  and  one-sided  actions  by  the  Commission  or  other
member states,  with subsequent  diplomatic  repercussions.43 There  was  an apparent
lack of political will when it came to establishing of a negotiation calendar acceptable
for both sides, especially after the end of 1974.
27 Since 1970 the Franco regime had stated that its aim was to progressively establish a
customs union with the Common Market, but the European Community had taken the
precaution  of  agreeing  to  the  conclusion  of  this  process  only  when  political
circumstances would allow it: in other words, after the death of Franco and the end of
his  regime.44 It  was  for  this  reason  that  by  1975  relations  with  the  EEC  had  not
progressed  beyond  the  point  they  had  reached  at  the  end  of  1972,  and  that  the
negotiation of a new treaty remained blocked because of internal EEC issues.45
28 The  signing  of  the  agreement  which  the  Spanish  ambassador  to  the  EEC,  Alberto
Ullastres,  and  the  Commission’s  director  general,  Roland  de  Kergorlav,  had  been
discreetly negotiating since early 1975 was nipped in the bud by this suspension of
negotiations. Along with a whole set of other political and economic circumstances, the
suspension meant that the 1970 Agreement –in its first phase and without significant
modifications–  remained  in  force  until  Spain  joined  the  EEC  on  1 January  1986.
However,  the 1970 Agreement was within the Common Trade Policy and contained
nothing which went beyond the area of trade. For this reason, certain measures, such
as those used against Greece in 1967, or those applied to Portugal, could not be adopted
against Spain, given that the Agreement made no mention of financial or economic
cooperation.46
29 This situation was to have a significant influence on the resolution of the crisis arising
between  Spain  and  the  EEC  in  the  autumn  of  1975,  given  the  ambiguities  and
contradictions of the position adopted by the EEC in the wake of the September 1975
executions. In particular, the question in need of clarification is why the Community
failed to seize this opportunity to revoke an agreement which left it at an economic
disadvantage and which, from a political point of view, might have aggravated the final
crisis of the Franco regime.
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The September 1975 executions
30 Throughout  the  summer  of  1975,  the  general  feeling  in  Spain  and  in  the  foreign
ministries of the EEC member states was that the Franco regime was on the brink of
collapse.47 Beset  by  countless  internal  and  external  problems,  including  its  own
international vulnerability, the mounting influence of the opposition to the regime, the
phenomenon of terrorist violence, internal dissension and Franco’s failing health, the
regime’s  reactions  were  increasingly  reminiscent  of  Spain’s  belligerence during the
1940s.48 Against  this  background,  and  with  all  kinds  of  rumours  circulating  as  to
whether Arias Navarro was to continue as Prime Minister,49 on 22 August, while Franco
was  on holiday  in  Galicia,  the  government  approved an anti-terrorist  decree  at  an
emergency cabinet meeting held at the Pazo de Meiras (Galicia). This decree covered all
actions of the opposition to the regime, re-establishing summary Councils of War and
the death penalty for anyone committing acts of terror against the State.50 Over the
following weeks, the decree was applied to 11 members of the terrorist organisations
Euskadi  Ta  Askatasuna (ETA)  and  Frente  Revolucionario  Antifascista  Patriótico (Patriotic
Antifascist Revolutionary Front) (FRAP) accused of being involved in the murders of
three policemen, the last of which had been committed on 14 July.51 The way in which
the trials were conducted caused general alarm in Europe: retrospective application of
the  new  anti-terrorism  law  was  an  unwonted  measure,  and  one  unknown  in  the
western world, where criminal law is only retroactive if it benefits the accused, never if
it works against him or her. 
31 Likewise, there was an outcry against the absolute lack of procedural guarantees in the
courtroom, where the procedure followed was so summary in nature that the lawyers
for the defence were not even given the chance to read the accusations against the
defendants. When they protested, they were expelled from the courtroom –the trial
was held at the El Goloso Barracks in Madrid on 11 September– and were replaced by
military  personnel.  All  this  only  served  to  increase  international  disapproval  and
condemnation.52 On 26 September, at a meeting which lasted for three and a half hours,
presided over by an extremely weak Franco, the Council of Ministers agreed that five of
the accused should receive the death penalty. At dawn on Saturday 27 September, the
executions took place in the city of Burgos and at Hoyo de Manzanares (Madrid). Two
ETA  and  three  FRAP  members  were  shot  by  firing  squad.53 Some  aspects  of  the
executions were truly barbaric, for example the shooting of one of the ETA members,
who had been left paralysed by shots at the time of his arrest.
 
European reactions
32 News of the Council of Ministers’ decision triggered a wave of protests against Franco’s
Spain,  accompanied  by  pleas  for  clemency  on  the  afternoon  of  the  26  and  strong
political  and  diplomatic  reactions  following  the  executions  on  September 27.  The
magnitude  of  the  European  reaction  was  no  doubt  influenced  by  the  widespread
conviction that the Franco regime was coming to an end.54 The combination of Prime
Minister  Arias’  disappointing  reforms,  revolutionary  events  in  Portugal  and  the
Spanish dictator’s increasingly fragile health gave Europe a more powerful reason than
ever to denounce the Franco regime, in defence of the democratic principles upheld by
the European Community.55 An editorial  in  the  Economist 56 entitled “Spain,  the  last
corrida” gives an accurate description of the atmosphere at the time: “Franco’s regime
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may go on agonizing for months, but its current behaviour is more like that of a bull
condemned to die”.
33 European  reactions  to  the  executions  were  no  more  clearly  expressed  than  in  the
demonstrations held all over Europe in front of Spanish embassies and consulates. On
several  occasions  these  degenerated  into  acts  of  violence:  the  Spanish  embassy  in
Lisbon  was  looted  and  set  on  fire,  while  police  and  firemen stood  by  and  did  not
intervene.  There  was  also  an  attack  on  the  Spanish  embassy  in  Vienna,  and  an
impressive concentration of more than 50,000 people attended a rally in the Champs
Elysées in Paris.57
34 These demonstrations were organised by the European Confederation of Free Trades
Unions, or by left-wing groups and political parties, irrespective of their relationship
with the government of their country. It is significant that the Swedish Prime Minister,
Olof  Palme,  led  the  demonstrations  in  his  country  and  called  for  financial  aid  for
families of victims of the dictatorship, and for the anti-Franco opposition. In Utrecht,
the  Dutch  prime  minister  also  headed  protests  against  the  Franco  regime.
Demonstrations took place in many European cities,  among the biggest being those
held in Milan, Rome, London, Frankfurt and Berlin. Acts of condemnation took place in
parliaments, city halls and other public and private institutions in various countries.
Nor could there be any doubt about the gravity of the situation at diplomatic level:
17 ambassadors were recalled from Madrid, 13 of these representing Western European
countries, eight of which were EEC members. 
35 As far back as March 1974, in the wake of the execution of Puig Antich and the attempt
to  expel  Archbishop  Añoveros,  the  European  Parliament  had  formally  warned  the
Spanish government that its repeated human rights violations and lack of respect for
minorities constituted a serious obstacle to EEC membership.58 A few days before the
27 September executions, the Parliament demanded that the Commission and Council
of Ministers suspend all relations with Spain if the shootings went ahead. 
36 Given the circumstances, Franco’s Spain lacked any leverage over these EEC countries,
who  also  voiced  their  condemnation  in  letters  written  both  before  and  after  the
27 September events.59 The prime ministers and presidents of the three most important
EEC countries –Great Britain, Germany and France– sent strongly worded letters to the
then Spanish prime minister Arias Navarro, the content of which was not of course
made known to  the  Spanish press  at  that  time.60 Arias,  who made the  most  of  his
prerogative  to  rant  against  the  EEC  governments  on  TVE  (the  Spanish  national
broadcasting channel), must however have paid some heed to the opinions of the EEC
governments:  after  the  letters  were  received,  several  symbolic  concessions  were
granted to the opposition, for example the issuing of a passport to Felipe González,
general secretary of the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE), enabling him to travel to an SPD
(German Social Democratic Party) meeting in Germany.61
 
European Political Cooperation in the face of the
September 1975 crisis 
37 The European Political Cooperation (EPC) was one of the key players in EEC relations
with Spain, but it was of less prominence than other participants because at that time it
was at a very early stage of its development. It was therefore not particularly effective
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when it came to coordinating a common policy for the Nine against the dictatorship. It
did  however  play  a  fundamental  role  in  gauging  the  degree  of  agreement  and the
orientation  of  Community  strategy  during  the  crisis.  The  EPC  was  conceived  as  a
mechanism, outside the EEC structure,  for discussing and coordinating positions on
foreign policy within an essentially but not exclusively declarative framework, given
that it  was from this forum that the Commission’s negotiating mandates with third
countries  emerged,  in  the  shape  of  the  Council  of  Ministers.  Its  procedures  were
derived from the ongoing close relationship between Council Ministers and the various
EEC foreign ministries,  a  relationship which made possible  the creation of  working
groups that were to play a key role in the exchange of information and the clarification
of collective positions. These proceedings, in the case of third countries like Spain or
Portugal, were conducted by diplomatic representations, with regular meetings which
took the form of exchanges of information, contact as well as with government and
opposition groups.62
38 As far as the object of our study is concerned, it should be pointed out that, at the first
EPC meeting in Munich (November 1970), the Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe was included in the agenda, making it possible to adopt a common position
on the defence of a European identity based on democratic principles. This common
position would influence the definition of  a  generic  position (one which would not
always be maintained during the first few years) on the need to promote and defend
democracy, coinciding with a renewed interest in the Mediterranean area which would
in due course affect relations with Spain. Even though Spain had regularly attended
EPC  meetings  throughout  1974  and  1975  within  the  context  of  the  Global
Mediterranean Policy revision, it was not until September 1975 that Spain’s internal
situation began to be looked at more closely. The tough session held on 6 and 7 October
1975, following hard on the heels of the other Community institutions’ condemnation
of  the  previous  week’s  executions,63 was  to  a  certain  extent  a  continuation  of  the
September  12th session,  at  which the  Netherlands  had requested the  adoption of  a
common position with respect to Spain’s internal situation.64
39 On 6 October 1975 two texts were adopted. The first was brief and to the point, stating
simply that “the Council confirms that under the current circumstances negotiations
between Spain and the EEC cannot be resumed”.65 The second was a declaration issued
in the name of the EPC which, after reflecting at length on the European values set out
in  the  Copenhagen  Declaration,  alluded  to  the  concern  over  the  risk  of  internal
destabilisation,  concluding  that  “only  a  democratic  Spain  which  accepts  European
values  will  find  a  place  within  the  Community”.  At  first  glance, the  aim  of  this
declaration appears obvious, and conventionally this is how it has been interpreted66:
to make clear to the Spanish authorities that, if they did not fully embrace democracy,
the doors of the EEC would remain firmly shut, as far as politics was concerned. At the
same time it conveyed its deep unease at the current situation. It did not go so far as to
adopt a position which could be interpreted as interference in Spanish internal affairs,
fearing a nationalistic reaction by the regime. However, a more detailed analysis makes
the need for additional comment clear.
40 Although the EPC, existing as it did outside the Community framework, was able to go
further than the Council of Ministers in its gestures and declarations, it was not subject
to  the  discipline  which  ruled  Community  conduct.  It  was  more  an  attempt at
pragmatism, aiming to bridge the gap between different countries’ sense of identity,
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national bureaucratic cultures and the divergent foreign policy priorities of the Nine.67
At the 6 October meeting, two conflicts became evident: the clash between national and
European  interests,  and  the  contradiction  that  existed  between  the  EPC’s
intergovernmental strategy and the work of the Commission, which was embraced by
the Community’s institutional base.
41 This conflict became clear in the exchange of accusations between the French foreign
minister, Jean Sauvagnarges, and the president of the European Commission, François-
Xavier Ortoli,  also a Frenchman, over the decision to suspend negotiations, and the
Commission’s  invitation  to  the  Council  to  declare  itself  on  the  subject.  Although
everyone involved was aware that this could lead to a diplomatic crisis in the relations
with Madrid on several fronts,68 what also became evident were the difficulties member
states  were  having in  exercising together  certain  aspects  of  their  sovereignty  with
regard to their foreign policy. There was also the question of the conflict of interests
which might arise if what was already known as “European policy” was given a higher
profile, should the Tindemans Report be accepted.
42 The debate over whether the Commission was exceeding its remit was concluded on
15 October when the European Parliament expressed its support for the Commission. At
this meeting, the Council President, Mariano Rumor, avoided any public controversy on
the subject by stating that the Council had joined the Commission’s initiative for the
reasons expressed68 by the Commission itself.69 In practice the Commission’s position
simply  meant  that  it  continued  to  pursue  the  previously  established  strategy  in
relations with undemocratic regimes, leaving it to the Council and the EPC to handle
diplomatic  relations.  This  was  in  accordance  with  the  “Second  Report  by  Foreign
Ministers to Heads of State and Governments on Cooperation in matters of Foreign
Policy”, and in the spirit of the Tindemans Report.
43 The institutional conflict alluded to in the EPC declaration of 6 October was, partly at
least, also a consequence of the difficulties facing the Nine when it came to articulating
a common position, owing to different national interests.70 Although all the countries
were in agreement on the need to break off negotiations with Spain, the formula that
was finally adopted was not initially universally accepted. After agreeing in the first
instance  that  their  objective  should  be  the  restoration  of  democracy  in  Spain,  the
ministers’ opinions diverged on just about everything else. France and Ireland felt that
certain historical factors should be taken into account.  They also feared that direct
criticism of the regime might provoke an escalation of violence, leading to a complete
breakdown of law and order. They felt it would be preferable to maintain some kind of
relationship with Spain, given that Franco would not live forever, and that it would be
necessary to preserve some kind of influence in the country following his death. The
UK, Denmark, Holland and, to a certain extent, Italy on the contrary called for much
more explicit condemnation, and Denmark and Holland even went so far as to demand
that  the  1970  Agreement  be  revoked.  Germany  and  Belgium  occupied  the  middle
ground, backing a clear rejection of the executions, but requesting that other options
should not be ruled out. In the end, France’s position was adopted, in order to prevent
further confrontation with the Spanish regime.71
44 It is significant that in the final text of the EPC declaration there is no suggestion that
the Nine’s ambassadors be recalled from Madrid, although this proposal appeared in
the first draft drawn up by the EPC’s Political Committee at the instigation of the Italian
presidency.72 The points under debate were: how to convey to the Madrid government
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that  the  ambassadors  were  to  be  recalled,  the  formula  to  be  used  and,  most
importantly, at what point they would return to Madrid. The Council president and
Italian Foreign Minister, Mariano Rumor, speaking at the press conference after the
meeting, would say no more than “this issue is of individual concern to each Member
State”.  And  so  in  the  end  there  was  no  unified  call  to  consult  the  ambassadors.73
Nothing more than moral and political disapproval was expressed. It was clear that no
structures were in place with the operative capacity required in this kind of crisis. 
45 The  27 September  executions  brought  into  sharp  relief  the  many  contradictions
present in the Community: paralysis in the decision-making process, lack of agreement
about budgets, and uncertainty born of a persistent economic crisis all laid bare the
limitations of the European project and the meagre progress achieved since the late
sixties.
46 From a moral point of view the EEC could not continue negotiating with a regime which
openly  violated  human  rights,  much  less  so  since  it  had  frozen  the  Association
Agreement with Greece in the wake of the Colonels’ coup. From an economic point of
view  the  Community  wanted  to  renegotiate  the  1970  Agreement  the  industrial
component of which seemed too favourable to Spain. The compromise solution was to
block the negotiations with Madrid.  Yet  on the same day,  the Council  of  Ministers
approved a substantial package of economic aid to Portugal.74
47 This lack of unanimity in the Community’s position on Spain was in marked contrast
with its attitude towards Portugal, whose internal evolution following the Carnation
Revolution was a subject discussed time and again at EPC meetings. The contrast is
even starker when we consider that what was being discussed was how the Nine were
to deal with Portugal, and that whatever conclusion was reached, this would serve as a
precedent for the treatment of Spain. The Spanish situation posed a much greater risk
for  the  EEC.  The  Council’s  work  dynamic  and  the acquis  communitaire  did  the  rest,
setting a limit on the debate and the chosen formula for communicating the suspension
of negotiations with Spain.
48 The EEC pursued two different policies: on the one hand it applied measures which
tended  towards  political  normalisation,  using  customs  and  trade  strategies,  and
implementing economic cooperation as part of a policy of protection of democracy in
Europe.  On  the  other  hand  it  made  political  declarations  that  had  little  economic
impact, and in the case of Spain it aimed above all at projecting an international image
of the EEC. 
49 The  EEC  intended  to  use  its  adopted  position  to  apply  pressure,  and  dissuade  the
Spanish  authorities  from  any  action  which  might  lead  to  a  potentially  violent
deterioration in their internal situation. But above all it wished to respond to economic
factors  relating  to  the  preferential  customs  arrangements  and  trade  results  which
Madrid  had  obtained  under  the  1970  Agreement.75 This  Agreement  was  proving
detrimental to other Mediterranean countries, i.e. France and Italy, and to countries
which had joined the EEC at its first enlargement in 1973, in particular Great Britain
and Denmark. From October 1975 onwards, negotiations between the EEC and the new
Spanish regime took undoubtedly a back seat when decisions were taken about Spain,
and  a  greater  attention  was  paid  to  the  political  and  economic  interests  of  the
respective countries.76
50 When evaluating the Community’s response to the final executions carried out under
Franco’s dictatorship, it should be emphasised that, at the same time as a European
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formula for support of the Spanish democratisation process was being drawn up, the
rather more thorny issue of the type of relationship to be established with a democratic
Spain  was  being  debated,  with  two  options  under  consideration:  fast-track
membership,  which  would  mean  opening  negotiations  with  the  new  Spanish
authorities in as short a time as possible; or a slower integration process which would
require the development of new strategies to safeguard the national positions of the
member states, thus prolonging the 1970 Agreement indefinitely.
51 This  general  situation helps  explain  the  reactions  of  certain  countries,  in  both the
negotiations between Spain and the EEC, and those held, bilaterally, with various EEC
countries. Singularly this was the case with France and Spain, as witnessed a year later,
again within the EPC framework, at a meeting held on 27 September 1976,77 when an
attempt was made to define a common position on a possible membership application
by Spain, and again at the Council of Europe in June 1977.78
52 The upshot  of  this  lack  of  consensus  was  that  each Member  State  defined its  own
position depending on its economic, political or strategic interests. Germany, Spain’s
main  supporter,  and  Great  Britain,  its  chief  customer,  called  for  Spain’s  speedy
integration into both the EEC and NATO.  Fundamentally  for  reasons of  Community
policy, Italy and the Benelux countries felt that any enlargement would slow down the
EEC’s process of political and economic integration. France was politically in favour of
Spain’s  membership as  it  felt  this  would help  to  rebalance an EEC that  was  biased
towards the north of Europe.79 Its industrial interests tended to favour a renegotiation
of the 1970 Agreement, and if  Spain were granted membership France felt it  would
become much harder to defend its own agricultural interests within the Community.
This concern was echoed by France’s affected interest groups and to a certain degree by




53 The EPC’s attitude towards the transition processes in southern Europe, particularly in
the case of Spain, shows the complex development of its strategies and capabilities,
reflecting its evolution from a Community with little international influence (beyond
its main remit of trade) to one which aspired to a position of greater importance on the
international  stage,  in  particular  within  its  immediate  geographical  and  cultural
setting.  The  fact  that  the  Franco  regime,  from  1967  onwards,  had  indirectly  and
progressively brought in the EEC as a qualified observer of its internal situation as it
undertook  trade  negotiations  would,  in  the  end,  determine  the  capacity  of  the
Community’s moral, political and economic influence during the Spanish transition. 
54 However, the EEC’s role in the democratization of the southern European countries was
not free of contradictions. This was because of the constant interaction of not only
economic and political, but also institutional and procedural issues, in a setting where
it was an intergovernmental task to take the decisions, and the Community’s task to
carry them out. Episodes like the September 1975 crisis, in the context of negotiations
with  Spain  and  Portugal,  prompted  a  fresh  assessment  of  the  Preferential  Trade
Agreements,  which  as  a  result  were  made  much more  restrictive  thereafter,  being
reserved exclusively as a preparatory phase for any country applying for membership.
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55 An interesting opinion was put forward by Raymond Aron in a controversial article
published in Le Monde 80 on 5 October 1975 entitled “Iberian contrasts”,  in which he
analysed  the  different  treatment  received  by  Portugal  and  Spain,  and  in  which  he
exposed what he considered to be the root problem. In Aron’s view, the decisions made
by  EEC  governments  and the  Community  institutions  in  the  aftermath of  the  1975
executions were more a response to individual political and economic interests than to
moral questions related to the democratic dimension of European integration. He went
further, asserting that things might have been very different if  the emergency that
arose in Spain –above all the danger of an escalation of violence– had not become an
internal matter for France.
56 Aron exposed the dilemmas facing the EEC when dealing with a regime already written
off by EEC foreign ministries, but more importantly he brought to attention two issues
which are key to our study. On the one hand, he made clear the limitations of the
progress of a European debate on the political, economic and institutional implications
of another EEC enlargement, not only because of the defence of all national interests,
but also because of the different views held on European integration.81 On the other
hand, and as a consequence of the above, he pointed to the impossibility in practice of
separating the formulation of strategies used by the EEC during the Spanish transition
from the position taken by the member states on the nature of the relationship to be
established between the EEC and the new regime in Spain.82 The point of balance was
found in the level of demands imposed on the candidate country: the same demands
which were made to any European country, with few advantages and even less special
treatment.  Official  negotiations  on  Spanish  membership  did  not  commence  until
5 February 1979 in Brussels, and Spain had to wait until 12 June 1985 to finally sign the
Membership Treaty in Madrid.
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ABSTRACTS
After the Franco regime’s last death sentences were carried out in September 1975, a crisis arose
between Spain and the European Community that entailed an international protest campaign
and the suspension of economic negotiations between Spain and Europe from October 1975 to
January 1976. Europe’s condemnation was a significant blow to Spain’s transition to democracy,
while it  also encouraged the European Economic Cooperation. This article analyzes European
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strategies during the period of uncertainty after Franco’s death and the links these strategies had
with the European integration process.
La crise qui s’est ouverte en septembre 1975 entre l’Espagne et les Communautés européennes
après les dernières exécutions capitales sous le régime franquiste se termine par une campagne
de  protestation  internationale  sans  précédents  depuis  l’après-guerre.  Elle  débouche  sur  la
suspension temporaire des négociations économiques d’octobre 1975 à janvier 1976 et soulève de
nombreuses questions quant à  l’objectif  et  aux implications de la  décision.  La condamnation
européenne constitue un tournant significatif dans le processus de transition et de consolidation
démocratique,  et  encourage  par  la  même occasion  la  Coopération  politique  européenne.  Cet
article analyse les stratégies européennes pour faire face à la période d’incertitude qui suit la
mort de Franco et leur lien avec l’agenda de relance du processus européen d’intégration.
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